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Abstract 
We provide evidence on the policy risk of social security in Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia by computing the changes in social security wealth induced by the pension 
reforms undertaken since the 1990s. Analyzing the impact of reforms on workers of diffe-
rent genders, ages, and education levels allows us to document the aggregate, inter-
generational, and intragenerational aspects of the policy risk. Pension reforms reduce so-
cial security wealth by amounts that sometimes exceed several years’ worth of earnings 
and have large redistributive effects across and within generations. Our findings imply 
that uncertainties about the redistributive impacts, timing, and political dynamics of re-
forms contribute significantly to the policy risk in addition to the inevitable demographic 
and economic risks. 
 
1. Introduction 
The choice between the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and fully funded pension sys-
tem is sometimes put in terms of a trade-off between return and risk. The funded 
system should provide a higher expected return on workers’ contributions at the cost 
of exposing workers to investment risk (Feldstein, 2005a,b), and (Lindbeck, Persson, 
2003). Since contributions are invested in stocks and bonds, which yield uncertain 
returns, workers face uncertainty about the level of their pension when they retire.
1 
However, the PAYG systems are not risk-free either. The rules of the pension 
system may be changed any time as governments respond to demographic, economic, 
or political shocks. As a consequence of this so-called policy risk, the contributions 
actually paid and benefits actually received by a worker may differ substantially from 
what she was promised by the pension legislation at various moments in her lifetime. 
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1 Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001), Feldstein, Ranguelova and Samwick (2001), and Poterba et al. (2005) 
produced quantitative estimates of the distribution of benefits upon retirement in a risky funded scheme, 
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Appropriate comparisons between the PAYG system and privately funded system 
should therefore involve a comparison of two risky systems. 
We provide a detailed descriptive account of the policy risk of social security in 
three Central European countries: Hungary, the  Czech Republic, and Slovakia. We 
compute the impact of all major changes in pension legislation adopted since the early 
1990s on the social security wealth
2 (SSW) of workers of different ages, genders, and 
education levels. Altogether these countries undertook ten reforms during the span of 
14 years covered. The reforms naturally differed in their breadth, from minor adjust-
ments of several parameters to full-scale reforms introducing a  mandatory funded 
pillar. 
An emerging literature has already produced some quantifications of the mag-
nitude of the policy risk. McHale (2001) computes the change in the present value of 
benefits induced by pension reforms that were implemented in the  G7  countries 
during the 1990s for average workers at age 45 and at the standard retirement age. He 
finds that some of the reforms reduced the present value of benefits by as much as 
29 % (the Italian 1992 reform) or 26 % (the German 1992 reform). McHale’s con-
tribution was valuable in demonstrating that cuts in benefits do happen and can be 
substantial. Shoven and Slavov (2006) compute the  internal rates of return from 
the Social Security in the United States since 1939 for an average, 10
th percentile, 
and 90
th percentile worker in 1900–1985 birth cohorts. They find “a considerable 
variation in the internal rates of return through time for a given birth cohort”. They 
also find substantial differences in IRRs across cohorts. Blake (2008) shows that 
even private pensions in the United Kingdom have not been completely immune to 
policy risk, but have been less sensitive than public pensions. Holst (2005) looks at 
a representative worker in the cohorts that have already retired in the United States 
and Germany and computes the discrepancy between the SSW that they were pro-
mised at age 55 and the SSW that they were promised when they actually retired. He 
also makes the first attempt to explain the deviation between realized and promised 
SSW by demographic variables. 
Our approach is methodologically similar to McHale (2001) except that our 
definition of SSW deducts the present value (PV) of contributions from the PV of 
benefits. In our opinion it is appropriate to deduct the contributions, as they are an im-
portant component of the worker’s lifetime wealth. For example, a reform that only 
raises the contributions clearly makes a worker worse off even though the PV of the be-
nefits remains unchanged.  
The main contribution of our paper is in providing a  more comprehensive 
picture of the policy risk. The preceding literature generally computes the changes in 
SSW for a representative worker in selected cohorts. It thus captures only the ag-
gregate component of the policy risk (the risk that a reform makes workers worse off 
on average) and partly the intergenerational component (the risk that a reform will 
affect one cohort differently than others). However, most pay-as-you-go systems also 
redistribute income within cohorts. This introduces an intragenerational component 
to the policy risk, i.e., the risk that a reform will affect one’s income group or gender 
differently than others. We document both the intergenerational and intragenerational 
2 Social security wealth is the expected present value of the future stream of pension benefits minus the ex-
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impacts of the pension reforms, as we carry out our analysis separately for men and 
women with different levels of education and for all pre-retirement cohorts.  
Although each of the reforms had unique impacts, our results do allow several 
generalizations. Most importantly, pension reforms produce large shifts in SSW and 
as such create substantial uncertainty. In seven of the ten reforms covered, there were 
some workers whose SSW declined by an amount exceeding the average annual ear-
nings in their country, and in four reforms there were some workers whose SSW 
declined by more than twice the average annual earnings.  
The reforms typically have had largely differential impact across cohorts, gen-
ders, and education levels. Seven reforms produced both winners as well as losers. 
As for the intergenerational redistribution, in four of the reforms older cohorts gained 
relative to younger ones (or at least lost less). In four other reforms older workers 
fared worse. While McHale (2001) observes that workers in the G7 countries aged 
slightly below the retirement age were essentially insulated from cuts in their SSW, 
this was not generally the case with the reforms studied here. Some reforms (Hunga-
ry 1997 and 1998) introduced different rules for different cohorts, and as a conse-
quence the change in SSW between comparable workers in adjacent cohorts differed 
by as much as 1.6 average annual earnings. In only three reforms were the inter-
generational patterns of the changes in SSW broadly consistent with optimal sharing 
of risk from negative demographic or economic shocks between generations. 
The intragenerational component of the  policy risk is also significant. As 
a whole, the reforms tended to be relatively beneficial to richer workers and detri-
mental to women. None of the reforms simultaneously benefited workers with lower 
education and hurt workers with higher education. Each country had at least one 
reform in which workers with university education benefited substantially relative to 
workers with low education (Hungary 1998, Czech Republic 1996, Slovakia 2004– 
–2005). The Slovak 2004–2005 reform was extreme in this regard – for example,  
50-year old men with elementary education lost 1.8 average annual earnings, while 
equally aged men with university education gained 4.7  average annual earnings. 
The desire to create a closer link between benefits and earnings is understandable. 
Nevertheless, the very fact that some older poor workers also experienced large cuts 
in SSW is troubling, as these workers generally have neither sufficient savings to 
cushion the cuts in benefits nor enough years of remaining working life to build them 
up.  
Another observation concerns the  political dynamics. Both radical reforms 
that introduced a funded pillar were quickly followed by another reform that miti-
gated some of its aspects. Should these two cases be generalized, such reversals make 
SSW more volatile, as one reform breeds yet another reform. On the other hand, they 
make SSW less volatile as long as the reversal reform brings SSW closer to the level 
it was at prior to the initial reform. Workers should somewhat discount the rules laid 
out by the first reform when making plans for the future. 
Switching to a mixed system in Hungary and Slovakia did not increase the SSW 
of almost any workers. This surprising by-product of our analysis can be attributed to 
two factors. First, both countries also promised generous PAYG benefits to high- 
-wage workers when they introduced the funded pillar. Second, the returns on sav-
ings in the pension funds appear to be low, due to a combination of overly conser-
vative investment strategies and high fees charged by the funds. The policy lesson is 332                                  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8 
that the rules governing pension funds are indeed critical in order to provide work- 
ers with a high return on their savings and to keep the administrative costs low.  
Our calculations indicate that neither Hungary nor Slovakia have set the rules well 
enough to realize the potential of the funded system.  
2. Methodology and Data 
Social security wealth (SSW) is defined as the difference between the present 
value of expected future benefits and contributions promised to workers under the cur-
rent pension legislation. We compute the impact of each reform on the SSW of all 
cohorts that either were working at the time of the reform or were born but not yet 
working, and within each cohort we carry out the computation separately for men and 
women and for representative workers with different levels of education: elemen- 
tary, lower secondary (apprenticeship), upper secondary (high-school with a school- 
-leaving exam), and college/university.  
The SSW for each cohort (a) at the  time of the  reform (T) is calculated 
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where R is the year of retirement, t is the current year, Ce and Cr are the employee 
and employer contributions, respectively, to both the PAYG and funded pillars, B is 
the value of the initial benefit from the PAYG pillar, A is the value of the initial be-
nefit from the funded pillar, r is the discount rate, w is the gross nominal wage, 
() StT is the probability of surviving until year t conditional on being alive at T, and i 
and j are the rates at which the benefits from the PAYG and funded pillars are in-
dexed. Calculating SSW involves three basic steps. First, the discounted value of 
future contributions is calculated from a projected path of wages and the contribution 
rates specified by the current legislation. Second, the initial benefit is computed ac-
cording to the formula prescribed in the legislation. Third, the discounted value of 
benefits is computed using the current indexation rule and a projected path of va-
riables that affect the indexations.
3 To put the results in perspective we normalize 
the change in SSW by the average annual earnings in the economy in the year of 
the reform. A change in SSW by -1.0 units hence means that the worker lost SSW 
equivalent to the annual earnings of the average worker.
4  
Computing the social security wealth required a number of assumptions about 
the wage profiles of workers, the evolution of certain variables in the future, and the re-
turns on savings in pension funds. These assumptions and the data used to construct 
3 The
 formula computes nominal SSW; we also discount all money flows by accumulated inflation to
obtain real (as of the time of the reform) SSW. 
4 The level of SSW of a worker who is at the beginning of her working career also indicates the degree of 
redistribution built into the PAYG system. If it is positive, the system effectively provides a net transfer 
to the worker, while if it is negative, the system effectively taxes the worker. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          333 
them are described in detail in Appendix B. Our general principle is that we attempt 
to compute SSW under the legislation as it is written on the books and as actually 
implemented. For example, if a particular reform was passed with an  understand- 
ing that some additional changes would be made in the future, we ignore those envi-
sioned but unlegislated changes.
5 Similarly, the rates of return on savings in pension 
funds are to a large extent affected by the regulation of funds’ portfolio choices and 
performance embedded in the pension legislation. Our assumptions about the future 
returns are based on the actual portfolio choices and performance of the funds instead 
of on arbitrary stock and bond market indices, which are indicators of potential, rather 
than actual, returns.  
Our “representative” workers start working at age 20, work without inter-
ruption (men) or with an interruption devoted to child care (women) until the stan-
dard retirement age, and at each age they earn the wage that is predicted by the wage 
profile specific to their gender, education level, and calendar year. The wage profiles 
were estimated for each country from large individual-level datasets. The length of 
life is probabilistic, and the future taxes and benefits are discounted by the survival 
probability.  
While the above assumptions are natural they inevitably have some limita-
tions. Analyzing only representative workers does not fully characterize the impact 
of the reforms across the income distribution. Likewise, the assumption that the wor-
ker’s wages follow a typical wage profile and that the worker is employed without 
interruption leaves out a  part of the  intragenerational component of the  risk. Two 
workers with identical lifetime earnings may be affected differently by a particular 
reform if they differ in their individual wage profiles or working histories. By as-
suming that workers work until the standard retirement age we do not analyze the im-
pact of changes in early retirement options that were part of some of the reforms and 
undoubtedly affected the workers who chose to exercise them. Analysis of such finer 
impacts of the  reforms would be worthwhile but would require detailed data on 
individual working histories that were not available to us. 
We assume that people had perfect foresight about the  future evolution of 
the relevant variables at the time of the reform. That is, the actual wages, infla- 
tion, and returns on assets in pension funds until 2005 are used as the expected 
wages, inflation, and returns at the time of the reform. For 2006 onwards, we as-
sume a 3% growth rate of real wages for all education categories and genders, and 
a 2% inflation rate.
6 To project the future returns on savings in Hungarian pension 
funds, we compute their average returns since the time they were established (1998). 
Slovakia introduced pension funds too recently to infer their historical returns. We 
therefore set the  expected future returns equal to the  average historical return on 
the portfolios that the funds currently hold. The fees charged by the funds are de-
ducted from the gross returns.  
3. Results 
Below we describe the main outcomes of the reforms as they concern dif-
ferent aspects of the policy risk.
7 The key characteristics of all the reforms are sum- 
5 The Hungarian 1998 reform is the most significant case; see section 3.2. 
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marized in Appendix C. Tables H.1–10, C.1–2, and S.1–4 present the main result – 
the change in SSW – separately for men and women of different levels of education 
and birth cohorts, for all the reforms. We report results averaged over cohorts born 
during 5-year intervals, due to space limitations.
8 When the pension system has two 
pillars, separate tables are reported for workers in the PAYG pillar and the mixed 
pillar. The figures illustrate the impact of selected reforms on selected genders and 
education levels, and also separate the overall impact into a change in contributions 
and a change in benefits. (Tables and Figures see in Appendix A.) 
3.1 Aggregate Risk 
Pension reforms do produce large shifts in SSW and as such create substantial 
uncertainty. In seven of the ten reforms covered, there were some workers whose SSW 
declined by an amount equal to or greater than the average annual earnings in their 
country, and in four reforms there were some workers whose SSW declined by more 
than twice the average annual earnings. At the extreme, the Slovak 2004–2005 re-
form cut the SSW of women with elementary education born between 1955 and 1959 
by 4.5 average annual earnings (Table S.1). Examples of other reforms with a large 
negative impact on SSW include the Hungarian 1993 reform (which postponed the eli-
gibility age for women by 5 years and thus cut the SSW of all women (Table H.1), 
the  Hungarian 2007 reform (which raised the  employer contributions and altered 
the benefit formula, resulting in a decline in SSW for all workers, in particular by 
more than 2 average annual earnings for men and women with university education 
born after 1980 – Tables H.9 and H.10), and the  Czech 1996 reform (which 
postponed the eligibility age for men by 2 years and women by 5 years and made 
the benefit formula more regressive, resulting in a cut in SSW by more than average 
annual earnings for most workers (Table C.1).  
The three countries experienced declines in fertility and improvements in life 
expectancy during the 1990s. Since defined benefit systems do not have automatic 
adjustments to such shocks, measures such as higher contributions, postponed eligi-
bility age, lower benefits or less generous indexations of benefits must be explicitly 
legislated – an inevitable source of aggregate policy risk. Governments should at-
tempt to allocate the risk optimally across generations when they legislate the changes. 
Optimal risk sharing generally requires (Gordon, Varian, 1988), and (Ball, Mankiw, 
2007) that the  burden from a  negative shock is distributed across all generations, 
although in absolute terms the  younger generations should bear a  proportionately 
greater burden.  
Several reforms were adopted with the  motive of improving financial sus-
tainability, and their impact on SSW broadly emulates the  optimal risk sharing 
pattern (with certain exceptions). Specifically, the Hungarian 1997 reform reduced 
the SSW of all men by 0.16–1.66 average annual earnings, and by less for most 
women (Table H.2). The Hungarian 2007 reform, adopted with a clear motivation to 
cut structural budget deficits, reduced the SSW of men with elementary education by 
0.26–0.99 average annual earnings and the SSW of men with university education by 
7 Readers who wish to see the results discussed chronologically by each country and reform are referred to
an earlier version of the paper (Dusek, Kopecsni, 2008). 
8 Detailed results for individual cohorts are available upon request.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          335 
0.61–2.45  average annual earnings. The  cuts in SSW were gradually larger for 
younger cohorts and somewhat smaller in absolute terms for women (Tables H.9– 
–10). Likewise, both Czech reforms (adopted in 1996 and 2002–2003) made ap-
proximately proportional cuts to the SSW of all workers with more than 10 years to 
go until retirement, and gradually smaller cuts to workers close to retirement, except 
that they hurt women more than men (see Tables C.1 and C.2 and Figures C.1–C.3).  
Some features of certain reforms are clearly inconsistent with optimal res-
ponses to aggregate shocks. The  current retirees are insulated from benefit cuts
9, 
contrary to the prescriptions of the literature on optimal risk sharing within a social 
security system (Bohn, 2001), and (Diamond, 1997). There were also reforms that in-
creased SSW approximately proportionally for all workers at least within the PAYG 
pillar (the Hungarian 1999 and 2003 reforms, which cut contribution rates and pro-
vided additional benefits, respectively; see Tables H.5–H.8). Such reforms make eco-
nomic sense if they respond to a positive shock. That clearly was not the case of 
Hungary in 1999 and 2003, as the two reforms were shortly preceded and followed 
by reforms which had a negative and much larger impact on workers’ SSW. The po-
litical mechanism hence produces additional risk by promising more generous be-
nefits even in the presence of a negative shock, necessitating an additional reform 
which cuts SSW by more than what would be necessary to improve the financial 
balance in a single reform.  
Even if reforms always uniformly reduced SSW, people would still be ex-
posed to additional risk about their timing. For example, shocks to fertility arrive 
gradually and take many years until they explicitly affect the financial balance of 
the PAYG system. Politicians may procrastinate before they implement the neces-
sary reform. Worker are exposed to the risk of whether the reform is adopted before 
or after they retire, and how severe the cuts in SSW would be if it is adopted before 
they retire (postponing the reform longer implying more severe cuts). 
3.2 Intergenerational Risk 
The reforms have largely differential impacts across cohorts, genders, and edu-
cation levels. In seven reforms there were both workers whose SSW increased and 
workers whose SSW fell. Such a pattern is generally inconsistent with efficient allo-
cation of risk.  
We observe a very diverse pattern of intergenerational redistribution. In four 
of the reforms the older cohorts gained relative to the younger ones (or at least lost 
less). In four other reforms it was the other way round.  
Reforms may have a  differential impact across cohorts by introducing dif-
ferent rules for different cohorts or by changing the general rules in a way that is 
relatively more beneficial to some cohorts than others. The Hungarian 1998 reform is 
an extreme example of the former. Among other adjustments it created different sets 
of rules for workers who were to retire before 2012 and after 2012. The benefit for-
mula sets the initial benefit as a certain percentage of the worker’s average net ear-
9 The reform legislations never cut benefits to current retirees and the changes in the indexation rules were 
generally beneficial to them. The  Hungarian 1998 reform was the  only exception, as it provided for 
a gradual switch from net wage indexation to Swiss indexation (50 % CPI and 50 % net wage growth). As 
a consequence, those already retired saw the present value of their benefits cut by as much as 20 %. 336                                  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8 
nings until 2012 and as a fraction of average gross earnings from 2013. It was also 
planned that benefits would become taxable at the  same time; however, the  cor-
responding change in the income tax code has not been implemented. This rather 
ambiguous provision creates additional uncertainty over whether benefits will be 
taxable at all after 2013, and if so, what the income tax rates will be at that time.
10  
The impact of the Hungarian 1998 reform on different cohorts is clearly vi-
sible in Figures H.2 and H.3. Men with university education retiring before 2013 
(the 1942–1950 cohorts) saw an increase in the present value of their benefits of ap-
proximately 49 % due to faster indexation of income brackets in the benefit formula. 
The same men born just after 1950 experienced an 80% increase (Figure H.3). In 
SSW terms, university-educated men and women born in the 1950s gained between 
3.2 to 3.5 average annual earnings, while those just slightly older gained between 2.4 
to 2.8 (Table H.3). The differential impact was less pronounced for workers with 
lower education, since the gap between gross and net earnings is smaller for them 
(Figure H.2 shows that men with elementary education born before 1950 expe-
rienced a small cut in the PV of benefits, while those born in the early 1950s ex-
perienced a small increase).  
Another example of a reform feature that reflects intergenerational risk is 
the Hungarian 1997 reform, which postponed the retirement age for men and women 
gradually to 62. However, it shifted the retirement age back by 1 year for women 
born between 1942 and 1944. The reform was clearly beneficial to these “privileged” 
women, whose SSW rose by as much as 2 average annual earnings (Figure H.1). In 
contrast, the SSW of women born between 1950 and 1954 fell by 0.45 (upper secon-
dary education) and 0.96 (university education) average annual earnings (Table H.2). 
Similarly, the Czech 1996 reform helped women just before retirement age 
(by raising their SSW by as much as 1.6 average annual earnings) while hurting all 
other women (Table C.1). This effect was due to a combination of a gradual increase 
in retirement age, which had only a minor impact on women who were close to re-
tiring, and changes in the benefit formula that turned out to be relatively more bene-
ficial to older women with historically lower earnings.  
The Slovak 2004–2005 reform had a particularly strong intergenerational pat-
tern. It gradually increased the retirement age from 55 to 62 years for women
11 and 
from 60 to 62 years for men. It cut contribution rates and allowed the opt-out of 9 %  
of the wage into the newly established private pillar. The new benefit formula made 
the benefit linear in the worker’s average earnings over his entire working history  
since 1994, up to a cap beyond which workers with more than 3 times the average 
earnings do not receive higher benefits. The reform provided for a transitory period, 
initially legislated to last until 2006, during which the benefits were in fact regressive  
in the worker’s lifetime earnings but becoming gradually less regressive over time. 
An additional provision that positively affected younger parents was a 0.5% deduc- 
tion from contributions for every child aged below 26 as long as the child was studying. 
10 We do not subtract any income tax when we compute the benefits after 2012, since our goal is to eva-
luate the impact of the reforms as they were actually legislated. 
11 This is the case for women with two children. For women with no children the eligible age increased 
from 57 years, for those with 1 child from 56 years, for those with 3–4 children from 54 years and for 
those with 5 or more children from 53 years. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          337 
The mix of these adjustments was much more beneficial to younger workers 
relative to older workers (Table S.1). Men with elementary education born after 1975 
gained (their SSW increased by 0.35–0.71  average annual earnings), while those 
born in the 1960s or earlier lost (their SSW fell by 0.8–2.38 average annual earnings, 
progressively more for older cohorts). Such differences are equally pronounced among 
women, especially poorer ones. Women with elementary education just before re-
tirement age (the 1950–1954 cohorts) lost as much as 4.29 average annual earnings. 
Losses of a similar magnitude are observed for all women with elementary or lower 
secondary education born during 1950–1964, and are gradually smaller for younger 
cohorts.  
The differential treatment of different cohorts is illustrated in Figures S.1–S.4. 
The retired cohorts were affected only by a change in indexations and the PV of their 
benefits rose by 11–14 %. Within each education level, the PV of benefits changed 
by an almost equal percentage for almost all working cohorts, while the percentage 
change in the PV of contributions differs by cohorts – those very close to retirement 
(1945–1948) saw a large increase (by 20–75 %), while those just at the beginning of 
their working careers experienced a 32% reduction.  
The negative impact of the Slovak 2004–2005 reform on older workers de-
monstrates how substantial the policy risk is and how uncertain SSW can be even for 
workers with just a few years to go until retirement. If we think of this reform (un-
usually radical as it was in many respects) as a realization from a tail of a distribution 
of possible reforms, one could argue that the policy risk is in some sense greater than 
the investment risk in the funded pillar. It seems inconceivable that an amount worth 
four years of earnings would vanish from the accumulated savings in a pension fund 
during the last few years before retirement. Moreover, large cuts in the SSW of older 
workers, and especially poor ones, impose higher costs on such workers than cuts of 
equal magnitude suffered by younger and richer workers. The former usually have 
neither sufficient savings to cushion the cuts in benefits nor enough years of remain-
ing working life to build them up. 
A few other reforms also hurt workers aged slightly below the retirement age. 
Specifically, the Hungarian 1993 reform reduced the SSW of women of pre-retire-
ment ages by between 0.4 and 1.3 average annual earnings; the 1998 reform was 
more severe, as it reduced the SSW of both men and women of pre-retirement ages 
by between 1.1 and 2.5 average annual earnings. The Czech 1996 and Slovak 2006 
reforms also hurt workers of pre-retirement ages, although by less than the younger 
cohorts. McHale’s (2001) observation that such workers were essentially insulated 
from cuts in their SSW does not appear to be a general phenomenon. 
To summarize, the intergenerational impacts of many reforms are not consis-
tent with optimal risk sharing and rather indicate that the political process generates 
additional intergenerational risk.  
3.3 Intragenerational Risk 
In the funded scheme, shocks to the stock market return raise or reduce the sa-
vings held by workers from a certain cohort by the same percentage irrespective of 
their wages or gender.
12 In contrast, the policy risk of the PAYG scheme contains 
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income levels and genders. Most reforms have a greater impact (positive or negative) 
on the SSW of workers with higher education, in part due to a higher absolute level 
of contributions and benefits. More interestingly, none of the reforms simultaneous-
ly benefited workers with lower education and hurt workers with higher education. 
Each of the countries had at least one reform in which workers with university edu-
cation benefited substantially (in absolute or at least percentage terms) relative to 
workers with low education (Hungary 1998, Slovakia 2004–2005, and, to a lesser 
extent, Czech Republic 1996).  
The Slovak 2004–2005 reform was extreme also in this regard, as it comple-
tely eliminated the  redistribution from rich to poor workers that was explicit in 
the benefit formula with only a 3-year transition period. The stark difference between 
the impacts of the reform on workers with different education levels is illustrated in 
Figures S.1 and S.2. The PV of benefits fell by 36 % for almost all working men with 
elementary education, while it increased by between 61 and 71 % for almost all work-
ing men with university education.  
Figures S.3 and S.4 depict the differential impact in SSW terms. SSW in-
creased by at least 4 annual average earnings for all male cohorts with university 
education born in 1947 or later, and it increased by 7.6 annual average earnings for 
the 1982 cohort (i.e. those just entering the labor market). Young men with elemen-
tary education gained comparably little (0.7 average annual earnings).
13  
The peculiar provision of the  Hungarian 1998 reform (setting benefits as 
a fraction of gross earnings instead of net earnings starting after 2012) had a strong 
redistributive impact as well, since the wedge between gross and net earnings is 
higher for high-wage workers. The SSW of the affected men with university educa-
tion rose by 1.95–3.49 average annual earnings (depending on the  cohort), while 
the SSW of men with elementary education changed only slightly, and similar diffe-
rences are observed for women (Table H.3). The Czech 1996 reform made the for-
mula somewhat less regressive and also increased the number of years counted in 
assessed earnings. SSW declined by approximately the same amount for all workers 
of the same gender (1 average annual earnings for men, 1.2 for women), implying 
that the declines were greater in percentage terms for workers with lower education 
(Table C.1).  
Five of the reforms had a distinctly differential impact on women compared to 
men. In three of them, women fared worse than men (Hungary 1993, Czech Republic 
1996, and Slovakia 2004–2005). In two of them they fared better (Hungary 2003 and 
Slovakia 2006), although overall the reforms tended to make women worse off.  
The large negative impacts on women in the three reforms were caused by 
larger postponements in retirement age for women than for men. Specifically, the Hun-
garian 1993 reform gradually postponed the retirement age for women from 55 to 60 
while leaving men unaffected. The Czech 1996 reform gradually postponed the reti-
rement age from 55 to 60 for women but only from 60 to 62 for men, and the Slovak 
12 This statement is strictly true only if all members of the cohort always hold the same portfolio.  
13 On the other hand the pre-reform system taxed high-wage workers particularly heavily – an average man 
with university education who had just started working had SSW of minus 13.1 average annual earnings. 
The post-reform SSW of men with elementary education who have just started working is still higher than
that of men with university education (-2 compared to -5 average annual earnings). Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          339 
2004–2005 reform did likewise (from 55 to 62 for women and from 60 to 62 for 
men). Such changes reduced the implicit redistribution from men to women, as 
women had been retiring earlier than men before the reform and surviving longer at 
the same time. 
The reforms as a whole tended to make the pension systems actuarially fairer 
and to reduce redistribution.
14 Such a trend logically followed from the highly egali-
tarian benefit formulas and very generous retirement ages for women that the three 
countries inherited from the communist era.
15 Actuarially fairer systems also reduce 
labor market distortions and tax evasion, a problem that had plagued the revenue side 
of the Slovak system before the reform. From the policy risk perspective, it is diffi-
cult to assess whether such intragenerational effects of the reforms could be antici-
pated or accommodated by workers. More importantly, the intragenerational effects 
of potential future reforms are much less predictable now than they could have been 
in the mid 1990s. Future reforms may be driven more by shifts in the government’s 
preferences on the left-to-right scale than by a systematic desire to eliminate the most 
egalitarian features of the old system.  
3.4 Early Reversals 
Two of the reforms studied here were truly radical, as they introduced a fully 
funded pillar. In both the Hungarian 1998 reform and the Slovak 2004–2005 reform 
current workers were given the option of switching from pure PAYG to a mixed sys-
tem, while new entrants to the labor market had to participate in the mixed system.
16 
The reform legislations allowed switchers to contribute 8 % to the funded pillar in 
Hungary (out of the 31% total contribution by both the employee and employer) and 
9 % in Slovakia (out of the 18 % total). Plus, the Slovak reform radically changed 
the benefit formula.  
The new government in Hungary was opposed to private pensions and just 
one year later it cancelled the increase in employees’ contribution to the private pillar 
that had been promised by the previous reform and increased the contribution rate to 
the PAYG pillar for workers in the mixed system. Figures H.4 and H.5 show the dif-
ferential impact on the stayers and switchers. While men in both systems experienced 
a 3% cut in contributions, workers in the PAYG had their benefits unaffected, while 
cohorts 1951 and younger in the mixed system saw the PV of their benefits decline 
14 We regressed the change in SSW on a measure of redistribution in favor of a particular worker type to 
formally assess whether the reforms systematically reduced redistribution. Our measure of redistribution 
was the  ratio of the  initial pension benefit to the  last wage in the  PAYG scheme before each reform. 
The unit of observation was the worker type characterized by gender, age, and education. We ran separate
regressions for each country but pooled all reforms and worker types within countries, and as additional
control variables we included the dummy variable for each reform, a gender dummy, and the number of 
years until retirement. The results show a statistically and economically significant negative relationship 
between the replacement ratio and the change in SSW. In the Hungarian case, workers whose replacement 
ratio was higher by 0.1 experienced a change in SSW that was 0.277 average annual earnings smaller
(the corresponding magnitudes are 0.135 for the Czech Republic and 1.28 for Slovakia). The change in
SSW for women was 0.18 average annual earnings smaller than that for men after controlling for other
variables in Hungary (0.81 in the Czech Republic and 1.44 in Slovakia). The results are available upon 
request. 
15 (Müller, 2002) 
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by 2.6–6.5 % (gradually more for younger cohorts, who, due to longer accumulation 
of savings, have a greater gap between the benefits from the funded and PAYG pil-
lars).  
Likewise in Slovakia, a reform adopted a mere one year later substantially 
postponed the final date by which benefits were to become strictly linear in earnings 
– from 2006 to 2014. This had a particularly negative impact on men with university 
education (Table S.2), whose SSW declined by between 0.25 and 0.85 average an-
nual earnings depending on the cohort.  
The policy risk from reversals of reforms should be particularly present if 
a radical reform is pushed through unilaterally by the current government coalition 
without a broader consensus with the opposition, as was clearly the Hungarian case. 
Early reversals make SSW more volatile, as one reform breeds yet another reform. 
On the other hand, they make it less volatile as long as the reversal reform brings 
SSW closer to the level it was at prior to the initial reform.  
3.5 Funded Pillar Appears to Reduce Policy Risk 
In the mixed system the two sources of future pensions are subject to different 
types of risk. Workers’ pension wealth is invested in a more diversified “portfolio” 
than under a  pure system, provided the  policy shocks in the  PAYG pillar are not 
positively correlated with shocks to returns in the funded pillar. Diversification hence 
provides a new argument in favor of a mixed system. Policy risk, however, is present 
also in the funded pillar
17 since politicians may adopt legislation that hurts workers in 
the mixed system relative to those in the pure PAYG system (the Hungarian 1999 re-
form being an example). Whether the mixed system is subject to more or less policy 
risk becomes an empirical question. 
Our results indicate that the funded pillar does reduce the overall policy risk. 
Almost all workers in the mixed system experienced smaller absolute changes in 
SSW than their counterparts in PAYG systems from the reforms adopted in Hungary 
and Slovakia after mixed systems were introduced.
18 Most of the subsequent reforms, 
after all, concerned only the PAYG pillar; therefore, their impacts were less pro-
nounced for workers in the mixed system, since the PAYG pillar constitutes only 
a fraction of their SSW. 
3.6 Relative Attractiveness of the Pure PAYG and Mixed Systems 
Both in Hungary and Slovakia, the  outcomes of workers who switched to 
the mixed system at the time of the radical reform reveal a surprising result – most 
workers should either not gain by switching, or gain only marginally. In the Hungarian 
1998 reform, consider the group that supposedly has most to gain from the private 
pillar, i.e., men with university education at the beginning of their career (1975–1979 
cohorts). The  change in SSW is essentially the  same regardless of whether they 
switched or stayed in the PAYG (2.28 and 2.27 average annual earnings, respectively). 
Since older cohorts contribute to the PAYG for a shorter time, they do not accumu- 
late enough savings to compensate for the 25% cut in the PAYG benefit, and so they 
are relatively even worse off by switching (Tables H.3 and H.4).  
17 (Blake, 2008) 
18 The reader can compare the respective pairs in Tables H.5–H.10 and S.3–S.4. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          341 
In the Slovak 2004–2005 case, almost all workers who switched, including 
young men with university education, gained slightly less or lost more (typically by 
0.1 to 0.4 average annual earnings) than their counterparts who stayed in PAYG 
(Tables S.1 and S.2).  
There are two causes for this finding. First, high-wage workers have an in-
centive to switch from a redistributive PAYG system to avoid redistribution. How-
ever, both Hungary and Slovakia adjusted the PAYG benefit formulas at the same 
time in a way that was highly advantageous for high-wage workers, reducing or even 
eliminating the redistributive element.
19 Second, the actual net returns of the pension 
funds appear to be too low to make the funded pillar attractive; high fees and very 
conservative investment strategies are the main culprits.  
The Slovak case is illustrative: The fees are regulated – a front-load charge  
of 1 % of the monthly contribution plus 0.07 % of the average monthly net value of 
assets. Such fees reduce the  accumulated savings after 40 years of constant con-
tributions by about 20 % compared to the idealized world with zero fees. Even though 
the so-called growth funds
20 are allowed to invest 80 % of their assets in stocks, they 
actually invest only 20 % because of additional regulation of the funds’ performance. 
While our calculations assume a somewhat higher share (30 %), the resulting pro-
jected nominal return of 6.9 % is not sufficient to make switching to the mixed sys-
tem attractive. The growth funds would have to invest 50 % in stocks in order to 
achieve the 8.1% return required to make young men with university education indif-
ferent between staying and switching.  
The relative unattractiveness of the funded pillar was hardly an intended out-
come of the reforms. It rather appears to be a by-product of a desire to radically re-
duce redistribution within the PAYG pillar and poor implementation of the funded 
pillar.  
The fact that more than 50 % of eligible workers in both Hungary and Slova-
kia switched appears at odds with our result. One possible explanation is that they 
may anticipate future improvements in the  net returns of the  pension funds. As 
the funds’ costs do not rise proportionately with assets, the average administrative 
costs will fall as workers build up their savings. Competitive pressures would then 
reduce fees and improve returns. The second explanation is based on portfolio di-
versification, i.e., workers shift some of their contributions to the funded pillar pre-
cisely to diversify away from the  policy risk in the  PAYG. Last, workers may 
realize that the current PAYG is unsustainable and therefore anticipate that their 
PAYG benefits will be less generous than they are promised by the current legis-
lation. 
19 If the PAYG benefits in Hungary do become taxable after 2013, the gains to switching to the mixed sys-
tem relative to staying in the PAYG system will be more favorable than our computations suggest. 
20 Pension fund administrators have to offer three types of funds differentiated by their risk and expected
return – growth, balanced, and conservative funds. Conservative funds may invest only in bonds and
money market instruments and must be secured against currency risk. Balanced funds must invest at least
50 % of their assets in bonds and money market instruments and at most 50 % in stocks. Growth funds 
may invest at most 80 % of their assets in stocks and at most 80 % of their investments may be left un-
secured against currency risk. The worker’s choice of type of pension fund is regulated in order to prevent
a significant loss as the worker approaches the retirement age – among other rules, workers with less than 
7 years until retirement may invest in conservative funds only.  342                                  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8 
4. Conclusions 
We documented the policy risk of social security by computing the changes in 
benefits, contributions, and social security wealth induced by pension reforms in 
three transition countries. Although the  policy risk has various sources, it always 
materializes through pension reforms, when past promises are replaced by new ones. 
The reforms usually involve numerous adjustments to contribution and benefit for-
mulas, which are complicated, not very transparent, and contain a large number of 
parameters. Such adjustments may affect people of different ages and earnings his-
tories differently, often in ways that may not have been recognized or anticipated by 
the legislators.  
Our findings confirm that the policy risk is real and can be substantial. We 
also show that the  PAYG system exposes workers to aggregate as well as inter-
generational and intragenerational risk. The policy risk of the PAYG system as doc-
umented here provides a new rationale for a pension system that combines the PAYG 
and funded pillars. A mixed system in effect follows the old investors’ recommen-
dation: “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.” Finding the optimal balance between 
the two pillars requires an appropriate quantitative comparison of the risks, one that 
would characterize the  policy risk in a  similar way to how stock market risk has 
traditionally been characterized. Making such a comparison represents a challenge, 
as the data-generating process driving the changes in SSW induced by pension re-
forms is fundamentally different from the data-generating process driving stock mar-
ket fluctuations. Our work may be regarded as the  necessary first step towards 
making such a comparison.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          343 
APPENDIX A  
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
TABLE H.1  Reform 1993, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  -0.01  -0.03  -0.19  -0.23             
1940–44  0.11  0.07 -0.03 -0.16 -0.40 -0.53 -0.90 -1.25 
1945–49  0.27 0.25 0.15 0.09  -0.45 -0.46 -0.79 -2.06 
1950–54  0.23 0.24 0.11 0.10  -0.45 -0.50 -0.83 -2.15 
1955–59  0.19 0.19 0.06 0.06  -0.43 -0.52 -0.87 -2.07 
1960–64  0.16 0.16 0.00 0.02  -0.41 -0.53 -0.88 -2.02 
1965–69  0.13  0.12 -0.06 -0.01 -0.40 -0.54 -0.89 -1.95 
1970–74  0.09 0.08  -0.08 0.03  -0.39 -0.53 -0.85 -1.80 
1975–79  0.06 0.05  -0.09 0.04  -0.38 -0.52 -0.82 -1.67 
1980–84  0.04 0.02  -0.11 0.02  -0.39 -0.52 -0.81 -1.57 
1985–89  0.02 0.00  -0.12 0.01  -0.39 -0.51 -0.79 -1.50 
1990–94  0.01 -0.01 -0.12  0.00 -0.38 -0.50 -0.76 -1.44 
 
TABLE H.2  Reform 1997, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univers-
ity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  0.04  0.02  -0.07  -0.34             
1940–44  -0.69 -0.84 -1.18 -1.66 0.63 0.74 0.99 1.00 
1945–49  -0.49 -0.53 -0.70 -1.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.59 
1950–54  -0.42 -0.45 -0.59 -0.92 -0.31 -0.34 -0.45 -0.96 
1955–59  -0.35 -0.38 -0.50 -0.77 -0.27 -0.29 -0.39 -0.86 
1960–64  -0.31 -0.34 -0.44 -0.67 -0.24 -0.26 -0.34 -0.77 
1965–69  -0.27 -0.29 -0.38 -0.58 -0.20 -0.23 -0.30 -0.69 
1970–74  -0.23 -0.25 -0.34 -0.51 -0.18 -0.20 -0.26 -0.63 
1975–79  -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.46 -0.15 -0.17 -0.23 -0.57 
1980–84  -0.18 -0.20 -0.28 -0.43 -0.14 -0.16 -0.21 -0.54 
1985–89  -0.17 -0.19 -0.26 -0.41 -0.13 -0.15 -0.20 -0.51 
1990–94  -0.16 -0.18 -0.25 -0.38 -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.48 
 
TABLE H.3  Reform 1998, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  -1.13  -1.21  -1.36  -1.46             
1940–44 -0.38 -0.16  0.69  2.08 -1.74 -1.92 -2.49 -1.91 
1945–49  -0.05 0.21 1.06 2.72  -0.57  -0.37 0.57 2.55 
1950–54 0.07 0.37 1.36 3.49  -0.47  -0.25 0.78 3.46 
1955–59 0.04 0.31 1.17 3.24  -0.44  -0.26 0.65 3.27 
1960–64  -0.03 0.20 0.88 2.77  -0.42  -0.29 0.44 2.78 
1965–69  -0.08 0.10 0.65 2.44  -0.39  -0.29 0.31 2.48 
1970–74  -0.12 0.03 0.54 2.37  -0.16  -0.08 0.54 2.84 
1975–79  -0.12 0.02 0.48 2.27  -0.13  -0.06 0.50 2.95 
1980–84  -0.08 0.03 0.45 2.14  -0.08  -0.01 0.48 2.78 
1985–89  -0.04 0.06 0.45 2.04  -0.01 0.05 0.50 2.66 
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TABLE H.4  Reform 1998, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
                          
                          
                          
1951–54 -0.57  -0.32 0.51 2.41  -1.24 -1.09 -0.27  2.17 
1955–59 -0.47  -0.26 0.46 2.29  -1.04 -0.93 -0.21  2.16 
1960–64 -0.38  -0.19 0.42 2.21  -0.85 -0.75 -0.13  2.13 
1965–69 -0.31  -0.14 0.39 2.17  -0.66 -0.57 -0.02  2.18 
1970–74 -0.23  -0.08 0.42 2.27  -0.33 -0.25  0.34  2.68 
1975–79 -0.14 0.00 0.46 2.28  -0.21 -0.13  0.41  2.89 
1980–84 -0.07 0.05 0.47 2.17  -0.14 -0.06  0.42  2.76 
1985–89 -0.03 0.08 0.47 2.06  -0.06 0.00 0.44 2.64 
1990–94  0.00 0.10 0.46 1.97 0.00 0.05 0.46 2.53 
 
TABLE H.5  Reform 1999, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01             
1940–44  0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
1945–49  0.07 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.15 
1950-54  0.10 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.24 
1955–59  0.13 0.15 0.20 0.34 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.31 
1960–64  0.16 0.18 0.24 0.42 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.37 
1965–69  0.19 0.21 0.28 0.50 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.42 
1970–74  0.21 0.24 0.31 0.56 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.46 
1975–79  0.23 0.27 0.34 0.59 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.48 
1980–84  0.24 0.27 0.34 0.57 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.48 
1985–89  0.22 0.25 0.32 0.54 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.46 
1990–94  0.21 0.24 0.31 0.51 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.43 
 
TABLE H.6  Reform 1999, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
                          
                          
                          
1951–54  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 
1955–59  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04  -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 
1960–64  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07  -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 
1965–69  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11  -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 
1970–74  0.05 0.06 0.08 0.14  -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 
1975–79  0.07 0.07 0.09 0.16  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
1980–84  0.07 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 
1985–89  0.07 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.00  -0.01  -0.04 
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TABLE H.7  Reform 2003, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  0.24  0.26  0.33  0.40             
1940–44 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.69 0.31 0.36 0.47 0.57 
1945–49 0.36 0.40 0.50 0.68 0.42 0.47 0.61 0.81 
1950-54  0.29 0.33 0.43 0.62 0.35 0.39 0.52 0.76 
1955–59 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.52 0.30 0.33 0.44 0.66 
1960–64 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.27 0.29 0.38 0.56 
1965–69 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.48 
1970–74 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.44 
1975–79 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.42 
1980–84 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.38 
1985–89 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.36 
1990–94 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.34 
 
TABLE H.8  Reform 2003, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
                         
                         
                         
1950-54  0.24 0.27 0.36 0.53 0.29 0.32 0.43 0.66 
1955–59  0.21 0.23 0.31 0.46 0.26 0.29 0.39 0.60 
1960–64  0.18 0.20 0.26 0.39 0.24 0.26 0.35 0.54 
1965–69  0.15 0.17 0.22 0.34 0.23 0.24 0.32 0.50 
1970–74  0.13 0.15 0.19 0.31 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.48 
1975–79  0.12 0.13 0.17 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.28 0.46 
1980–84  0.10 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.44 
1985–89  0.09 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.41 
1990–94  0.09 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.39 
 
TABLE H.9  Reform 2007, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00             
1940–44  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1945–49  -0.26 -0.29 -0.37 -0.66 -0.21 -0.24 -0.30 -0.47 
1950–54  -0.25 -0.28 -0.38 -0.61 -0.24 -0.26 -0.35 -0.63 
1955–59  -0.33 -0.38 -0.53 -0.85 -0.31 -0.34 -0.47 -0.86 
1960–64  -0.46 -0.53 -0.72 -1.22 -0.43 -0.47 -0.64 -1.16 
1965–69  -0.58 -0.67 -0.90 -1.58 -0.54 -0.58 -0.80 -1.44 
1970–74  -0.70 -0.81 -1.07 -1.91 -0.64 -0.69 -0.95 -1.69 
1975–79  -0.81 -0.94 -1.22 -2.19 -0.74 -0.79 -1.08 -1.89 
1980–84  -0.92 -1.04 -1.35 -2.40 -0.80 -0.85 -1.15 -2.00 
1985–89  -0.99 -1.12 -1.45 -2.45 -0.86 -0.92 -1.23 -2.06 
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TABLE H.10  Reform 2007, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
                          
                          
                          
1951–54  -0.21 -0.24 -0.34 -0.52 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.55 
1955–59  -0.33 -0.38 -0.53 -0.85 -0.31 -0.34 -0.47 -0.86 
1960–64  -0.46 -0.53 -0.72 -1.22 -0.43 -0.47 -0.64 -1.16 
1965–69  -0.58 -0.67 -0.90 -1.58 -0.54 -0.58 -0.80 -1.44 
1970–74  -0.70 -0.81 -1.07 -1.91 -0.64 -0.69 -0.95 -1.69 
1975–79  -0.81 -0.94 -1.22 -2.19 -0.74 -0.79 -1.08 -1.89 
1980–84  -0.92 -1.04 -1.35 -2.40 -0.80 -0.85 -1.15 -2.00 
1985–89  -0.99 -1.12 -1.45 -2.45 -0.86 -0.92 -1.23 -2.06 
1990–94  -0.97 -1.09 -1.40 -2.33 -0.84 -0.90 -1.19 -1.96 
 




tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1936–39  -0.09  -0.14  -0.32  -0.33             
1940–44  -0.91 -0.90 -1.06 -0.98 1.60 1.40 1.01 0.75 
1945–49  -1.16 -1.10 -1.27 -1.23 -0.73 -0.81 -0.76 -0.87 
1950–54  -1.16 -1.12 -1.27 -1.25 -1.05 -1.22 -1.24 -1.38 
1955–59  -1.16 -1.12 -1.24 -1.21 -1.11 -1.28 -1.28 -1.40 
1960–64  -1.16 -1.14 -1.21 -1.15 -1.14 -1.30 -1.25 -1.37 
1965–69  -1.15 -1.14 -1.19 -1.11 -1.18 -1.32 -1.23 -1.35 
1970–74  -1.12 -1.11 -1.15 -1.07 -1.17 -1.30 -1.20 -1.32 
1975–79  -1.08 -1.07 -1.11 -1.02 -1.14 -1.26 -1.16 -1.27 
1980–84  -1.05 -1.03 -1.08 -1.00 -1.13 -1.24 -1.14 -1.25 
1985–89  -1.01 -0.99 -1.04 -0.96 -1.09 -1.20 -1.10 -1.21 
1990–94  -0.96 -0.95 -1.00 -0.91 -1.06 -1.16 -1.05 -1.16 
1995–96  -0.93 -0.92 -0.96 -0.89 -1.05 -1.15 -1.05 -1.15 
 
TABLE C.2  Reform 2002–03, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average earnings 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1941–44  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01             
1945–49  -0.13 -0.14 -0.21 -0.31 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
1950–54  -0.48 -0.53 -0.65 -0.93 -0.61 -0.64 -0.78 -1.04 
1955–59  -0.56 -0.63 -0.79 -1.11 -0.86 -0.92 -1.16 -1.51 
1960–64  -0.60 -0.67 -0.86 -1.24 -0.87 -0.93 -1.19 -1.57 
1965–69  -0.64 -0.71 -0.92 -1.36 -0.85 -0.92 -1.20 -1.60 
1970–74  -0.68 -0.76 -0.99 -1.48 -0.86 -0.93 -1.23 -1.65 
1975–79  -0.72 -0.80 -1.05 -1.59 -0.84 -0.90 -1.20 -1.60 
1980–84  -0.75 -0.83 -1.09 -1.66 -0.82 -0.89 -1.19 -1.58 
1985–89  -0.74 -0.82 -1.08 -1.60 -0.80 -0.87 -1.17 -1.52 
1990–94  -0.71 -0.78 -1.03 -1.53 -0.77 -0.83 -1.11 -1.45 
1995–99  -0.67 -0.74 -0.97 -1.44 -0.72 -0.78 -1.05 -1.37 
2000–03  -0.65 -0.72 -0.94 -1.39 -0.70 -0.76 -1.01 -1.32 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          347 
TABLE S.1  Reform 2004–2005, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction 
of the annual average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  0.37  0.39  0.41  0.42             
1940–44  0.21  0.24  0.52  0.89             
1945–49 -2.38  -1.83  -0.41 3.97 0.45 0.48 0.58 0.97 
1950–54 -1.83  -1.22 0.11 4.69  -4.29 -4.03 -2.81 -0.23 
1955–59 -1.29  -0.66 0.62 5.27  -4.50 -4.26 -3.20 -0.87 
1960–64 -0.80  -0.14 1.10 5.89  -4.08 -3.82 -2.82 -0.43 
1965–69 -0.37 0.33 1.54 6.42  -3.61 -3.33 -2.32  0.16 
1970-74  0.01 0.76 1.92 6.86  -3.23 -2.89 -1.91  0.60 
1975–79  0.35 1.13 2.28 7.31  -2.89 -2.51 -1.55  0.98 
1980–84  0.65 1.45 2.58 7.55  -2.54 -2.12 -1.16  1.33 
1985–89  0.75 1.54 2.62 7.24  -2.32 -1.90 -0.95  1.33 
1990–94  0.71 1.46 2.49 6.87  -2.20 -1.80 -0.90  1.26 
 
TABLE S.2  Reform 2004–2005, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
                          
                          
                          
1953–54  -1.72  -1.16  0.14  4.59             
1955–59 -1.38  -0.80 0.45 4.94  -4.61 -4.41 -3.32 -1.19 
1960–64 -0.91  -0.32 0.90 5.51  -4.25 -4.05 -3.02 -0.88 
1965–69 -0.49 0.14 1.33 6.05  -3.80 -3.59 -2.56 -0.35 
1970–74 -0.10 0.57 1.72 6.53  -3.41 -3.17 -2.15  0.08 
1975–79  0.26 0.95 2.08 6.96  -3.07 -2.80 -1.83  0.35 
1980–84  0.56 1.28 2.37 7.15  -2.71 -2.42 -1.45  0.61 
1985–89  0.67 1.38 2.41 6.85  -2.50 -2.18 -1.24  0.63 
1990–94  0.63 1.30 2.29 6.50  -2.37 -2.07 -1.18  0.59 
 






tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
1935–39  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00             
1940–44  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00             
1945–49 0.30  0.19  0.02  -0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1950–54 0.08  0.09  -0.05  -0.26  0.44 0.40  -0.03  -0.16 
1955–59 0.00  0.03  -0.10  -0.25  -0.03 0.00  -0.09  -0.04 
1960–64  -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.45 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.13 
1965–69  -0.11 -0.11 -0.21 -0.41 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 -0.13 
1970–74  -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.32 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
1975–79  -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980–84  -0.13 -0.16 -0.19 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985–89  -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 -0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1990–94  -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 348                                  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8 
TABLE S.4  Reform 2006, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual 
average wage 
Men Women    
Cohort  Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer-
sity 
Elemen-
tary  Lower Upper  Univer- 
sity 
                          
                          
                          
1953–54  0.02  0.06  -0.06  -0.10             
1955–59 0.00  0.02  -0.08  -0.21  -0.02 0.00  -0.08  -0.03 
1960–64  -0.06 -0.05 -0.15 -0.37 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 
1965–69  -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.35 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 
1970–74  -0.12 -0.13 -0.18 -0.31 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
1975–79  -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980–84  -0.13 -0.16 -0.19 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985–89  -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 -0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1990–94  -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our “average” workers start working at age 20, work full-time until the stan-
dard retirement age,
21 and earn the wage that is predicted by the wage profile specific 
to their gender, educational category, and calendar year. The wage profiles are es-
timated from individual level cross-sectional datasets described below and have 
the standard form 
2
12 log ijt jt jt ijt jt ijt ijt wa a u αβ β =+ + + 
where w is the monthly wage, subscript i denotes an individual, j denotes the wor-
ker’s gender and educational category, t denotes the year, a is the worker’s age, and 
α, β1, and β2 are the parameters that we estimate. The profiles were estimated on 
a sample of workers aged between 20 and the standard retirement age who worked at 
least 6 months in a given year. The regression estimates and the corresponding wage 
profiles are available upon request.  
We constructed the wage profiles from individual-level datasets that were best 
suited to the task in each country. All of them contain basic information about each 
worker (gender, age, education level) and sufficient information about his/her em-
ployment status and labor income (either the monthly wage or the annual/quarterly 
wage and the number of weeks/months worked, from which the monthly wage can be 
imputed). For Hungary, we used the Harmonized Hungarian Wage Survey of the Pub-
lic Employment Service. The survey was collected at the firm level in 1986 and 1989 
and annually from 1992 to 2003 and contains data on 100,000–200,000 employees 
depending on the  year. For the  Czech Republic, we used the  Czech Microcensus, 
a representative household survey conducted once every 4 or 6 years by the Czech 
Statistical Office. The surveys that we use were collected in 1992, 1996, and 2002
22 
and cover approximately 44,000, 64,000, and 19,000 individuals in the respective 
years. For Slovakia, we used the TREXIMA dataset, a representative survey of firms. 
Collected in 2001, it contains quarterly data on 350,000 employees.  
Since the samples allow us to estimate the wage profiles only for some years
23 
while we need to have profiles for all years since 1988 (Hungary), 1986 (Czech Re-
21 Workers with university education start working at age 22. Women have 2 children; the first one is born 
at the average age of the first childbirth in the respective country and year (information collected from
the population statistics published by each country’s statistical office), and the second one two years later. 
Women spend 5 years (Czech Republic, Slovakia) or 4 years (Hungary) in childcare without earning labor 
income.  
22 Unfortunately, the 1988 microcensus was not usable for our purpose, since all observations are recorded
at the household level and not the individual level. Even though it does report the earnings of the head of 
household and his spouse, it does not allow us to identify the gender of workers who live in households 
other than traditional families of married couples. 
23 The Hungarian Wage Survey is not available for 1987–1988, 1990–1991, and 2004+. Moreover, the sur-
veys from 1993, 1998–1999, and 2002 appeared to contain data problems, since the estimates of the wage 
profiles in these years produced estimates that were substantially different from the estimates for adjacent 
years and, more importantly, were economically implausible.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          353 
public) or 1984 (Slovakia), we impute the profiles for the remaining years. We as-
sume that the coefficients on the age and age squared are the same as in the nearest 
adjacent year for which the profile was estimated.
24 Then we adjust the intercept α 
such that the average fitted wage in the sample is equal to the actual average wage in 
the year for which the wage profile is being imputed.
25 
The 2004–2005 Slovak reform allowed one of the parents to deduct 0.5 % for 
every child from their PAYG contributions. We assume that the deduction is claimed 
by men, since they earn more on average.  
Future projections 
Certain assumptions about the future were required to project future benefits 
and contributions. The length of life is probabilistic and future money flows are dis-
counted by the survival probability. We had survival probability tables for all coun- 
tries (unfortunately without a finer breakdown by education categories) until 2004. For 
2005 onwards, we assume that the survival probabilities are the same as in 2004.
26  
We assume that as of the time of the reform people had perfect foresight about 
the evolution of all economic variables that affect future taxes and benefits (aggre-
gate and individual wage growth, inflation, survival probabilities). That is, the future 
wages, inflation rates and survival probabilities that are expected at the  time of 
the reform are equal to the wages and inflation rates that were actually realized up  
to 2005, and for 2006 onwards we assume a 3% growth rate of real wages for all 
education categories and genders and a 2% inflation rate. 
The rate of return on savings in pension funds is the key parameter affecting 
the benefits from the funded pillar. It is to a large extent determined by the regulation 
of funds’ investments and fees. Our choice of rate of return is an estimate of the net 
rate of return that the pension funds, as actually established and regulated by Hun-
garian and Slovak law, are expected to deliver to their clients. That is, we avoid using 
an average historical return on some “optimal” stock and bond portfolio as common-
ly done in simulations of benefits from the funded pillar (e.g. (Feldstein, Ranguelova, 
2001), since that approach would give the  level of benefits that the  funded pillar 
could provide rather than did provide.  
For Hungary, the expected real return on savings is calculated as the weight-
ed average of the real net return
27 of all Hungarian pension funds during 1998–2005, 
which was 2.7 %
28 Pension funds in Slovakia were established too recently to project 
future returns from historical returns. Instead, we compute the expected future returns 
as the average historical returns on the portfolios that the growth funds currently hold. 
Specifically, we calculate the average historical return for each of the major bond and 
24 For example, the coefficients on age and age squared estimated from the Czech 2002 Microcensus were 
used to generate wage profiles for 2000–2004. 
25 The data sources for average wages by gender and education level are reported in detail in an earlier 
version of the paper (Dušek, Kopecsni, 2008, p. 25). 
26 This assumption probably underestimates the true survival probabilities, since life expectancies have 
been increasing in all three countries since the 1990s and are expected to increase in the future. However, 
we were not able to obtain specific projections of future survival probabilities. 
27That is, after deducting fees. 
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stock indices in which the funds currently invest, and then compute the average of 
these returns weighted by their share in the average growth fund’s portfolio.
29 The re-
sulting projected nominal rate of return after deducting fees is 6.9  percent.
30 As 
workers approach retirement age they may prefer a gradual switch to a completely 
risk-free portfolio (and in Slovakia they are in fact required to switch to more con-
servative funds). We therefore assume that the above-mentioned returns apply only 
from the beginning of employment until 15 years before retirement. Afterwards wor-
kers rebalance the portfolio each year such that the real return linearly decreases to 
zero by the age of retirement.  
The pension funds offer unisex life annuities, which we computed as follows: 
First, the share of men and women upon retirement in the population is weighted  
by their wages. Next, the population structure in the future is projected by applying 
the  mortality tables separately for the  male and female parts of the  population. 
The two projections are combined to obtain the evolution of the unisex population. 
The annuities are computed by applying the actuarial formulas to this unisex popu-
lation. Finally, as the annuities are subject to Swiss indexation the technical interest 
rate was modified by the magnitude of this indexation.  
Computing future indexations of benefits in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
required additional assumptions. The legislation before the first reform did not pre-
scribe any indexations, yet it is implausible to assume that the benefits or the system 
parameters would never be indexed. In fact, the benefits had been indexed in an ad- 
-hoc manner with a clear goal to preserve their real value. Therefore, we assume that 
once granted, benefits would have been indexed for inflation, and the income bra-
ckets in the  benefit formula would be indexed for wage growth. Under these as-
sumptions, the replacement ratio remains at a similar level (48–50 % in the Czech 
Republic, 30–35  % in Slovakia) as it was during the  years just preceding the  re-
form.
31 After the 1996 reform, Czech law prescribed minimum indexations, but the go-
vernment frequently provided more generous increases.
32 Therefore, until 2006 we 
assume perfect foresight and compute the benefits as they were actually indexed, and 
only after 2006 we index them conservatively by the minimum prescribed by the le-
gislation. 
29 Specifically, the expected returns are computed from the returns on the following indices over the pe-
riods indicated: UX 1991–2007, PX 1995–2007, SLOVN SK 1999–2007, VIX 1990–2003, MXEU 1995–
–2007, FTSE 1990–2003, DAX 1990–2007, and SPX 1990–2007. The funds’ stock portfolio is composed 
of stock indices in the  Visegrad countries (20  %), the  EU-15 countries (50  %), and the  United States 
(30 %). Data on the portfolio compositions were taken from the funds’ annual reports.  
30 The growth funds currently invest 80 % of their assets in bonds, which appears to be an overtly con-
servative strategy, particularly if the legislation restricts them to investing at most 80 % in stocks. Even 
though other regulations give funds incentives to invest in stocks below the maximum limit, several fund 
managers admit in official reports that they do plan to increase the share of stocks in the near future. In our 
computation we therefore assume that they will invest 30 % in stocks. 
31 In addition, prior to 1995, the new benefits were computed according to the old formula but were in-
creased immediately (by 32 % in 1995) to make up for the inflation that had accumulated since 1990. We 
assume that such increases in newly granted benefits would continue into the future with the same pur-
pose of compensating for the reduction in the real value of past wages that enter the benefit due to in-
flation. We increase the new benefits by 32 %, and further increase them by the ratio of the price index at 
the time of retirement to the average price index during the 5 years preceding retirement.  
32 (Dušek, 2007) Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8                                          355 
APPENDIX C 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE REFORMS 
 
 Hungary  (1993) 
Pension Scheme  PAYG system 
Retirement Age  Men: 60, Women: 55 to 60 gradually 
Contribution Rate  Employer: 24.5 %, Employee: 6 % 
Assessed Earnings  Average net monthly earnings during 4 years with highest earnings 
in the 5 years before retirement   average net monthly earnings from 1988 
until the year of retirement 
Benefit Formula  The benefit is set as a certain fraction (pension accrual) of average net 
earnings during the period considered. The benefits are regressive in average 
net earnings but less regressive after the reform. 
Indexation Rule  Net wage indexation 
  
Hungary (1997) 
Pension Scheme  PAYG system 
Retirement Age  Men: 60 to 62 gradually, Women: 55 to 62 gradually except cohorts  
1942–1944 whose retirement age was shifted back by 1 year 
Contribution Rate  Employer: 24.5 % to 24.0 %, Employee: 6 % 
Assessed Earnings  No change 
Benefit Formula  Higher pension accrual was applied 
Indexation Rule  No change 
 
Hungary (1998) 
Pension Scheme  The reform split the mandatory PAYG scheme into a public PAYG and 
privately funded pillar. The workers already employed had the option to switch 
from the public to the mixed system and more than 50 % of eligible workers 
did switch. For new entrants to the labor market, participation in the mixed 
system was compulsory. 
Retirement Age  No change 
Contribution Rate  PAYG scheme – Employer: 24 % to 23 % (1999), to 22 % (2000),  
Employee: 6 % to 7 % (1998), to 8 % (1999), to 9 % (2000)  
Mixed scheme – Employer: 24 % to 23 % (1999), to 22 % (2000),  
Employee: (PAYG pillar): 1 % Employee (Funded pillar): 6 % (1998),  
7 % (1999), 8 % (2000) 
Assessed Earnings  No change 
Benefit Formula  The benefit formula should switch from the net to the gross principle after 
2013, meaning that the benefit will then be set as a fraction of average gross 
earnings instead of net earnings. It was also planned that the benefit would 
become taxable. The degression is gradually eliminated in the calculation. 
The switchers in the mixed system will have their benefit from the public pillar 
reduced by 25 % in such a way that their accruals are 75 % of stayers’ 
accruals. In addition, they will receive unisex annuities from savings in 
the pension fund. 
Indexation Rule  Net wage indexation   Swiss indexation, gradually since 2001 
  
  Hungary (1999) 
Pension Scheme  Multi pillar system – public PAYG pillar with privately funded pillar 
Retirement Age  No change 
Contribution Rate  PAYG scheme – Employer: 23 % to 22 % (1999), 22 % to 21 % (2000), 
Employee: 8 % (1999), 9 % to 8 % (2000), 
Mixed scheme – Employer: 23 % to 22 % (1999), 22 % to 21 % (2000), 
Employee (PAYG pillar): 1 % to 2 %, Employee (Funded pillar): 7 % to 6 % 
(1999), 8 % to 6 % (2000) 356                                  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 7-8 
Assessed Earnings  No change 
Benefit Formula  No change 
Indexation Rule  No change 
  
Hungary (2003) 
Pension Scheme  Multi pillar system – public PAYG pillar with privately funded pillar 
Retirement Age  No change 
Contribution Rate  PAYG scheme – Employer: 18 %, Employee: 8 % to 8.5 %, 
Mixed scheme – Employer: 18 %, Employee (PAYG pillar): 2 % to 1.5 %, 
Employee (Funded pillar): 6 % to 7 %  
Assessed Earnings  No change 
Benefit Formula  Gradual introduction of an additional monthly benefit (13th monthly pension) 
within PAYG pillar. Pensioners would effectively receive their benefit 13 times 
a year from 2006 onwards. 
Indexation Rule  No change 
  
Hungary (2007) 
Pension Scheme  Multi pillar system – public PAYG pillar with privately funded pillar 
Retirement Age  No change 
Contribution Rate  PAYG scheme – Employer: 17 % to 21 % (2007), 16 % to 21 % (2009), 
Employee: 8.5 %,  
Mixed scheme – Employer: 17 % to 21 % (2007), 16 % to 21 % (2009), 
Employee (PAYG pillar): 0.5 %, Employee (Funded pillar): 8 %  
Assessed Earnings  No change 
Benefit Formula  For workers who would retire between 2008 and 2012 the employees’ pension 
and health care contributions and the employees’ contribution to the employ-
ment fund will be deducted from the net earnings entering the benefit formula 
in a way that will reduce the benefit. Earnings during the whole life will be 
indexed to the level of the individual's last working year, while before 
the reform earnings in the last three working years were not indexed at all. 
Indexation Rule  No change 
  
Czech Republic (1996) 
Pension Scheme  PAYG system 
Retirement Age  Men: 60 to 62 gradually, Women: 55 to 59 gradually 
Contribution Rate  Employer: 19.5 %, Employee: 6.5 % 
Assessed Earnings  Earnings from 5 years with the highest earnings during the 10 years prior to 
retirement   average monthly earnings from the 30 years of employment 
preceding retirement since 1986 
Benefit Formula  The new benefit formula introduced a flat component of the benefit (same 
for all retirees) and at the same time made the variable component (which 
depends on the worker’s average lifetime earnings) less regressive; 
the ceiling on the maximum benefit was abolished 
Indexation Rule  Indexation ad hoc   indexation to the consumer price index and at least 
once every two years also for at least 33 % of real wage growth, but 
the government has the discretion to provide more generous indexation. 
   
Czech Republic (2002–2003) 
Pension Scheme  PAYG system 
Retirement Age  Men: 60 to 63 gradually, Women: 55 to 61 gradually by 2013 
Contribution Rate  Employer: 19.5 % to 21.5 %, Employee: 6.5 % 
Assessed Earnings  No change 
Benefit Formula  No change 
Indexation Rule  Benefits have to be adjusted annually and the minimum increase has to 
include inflation plus at least 33 % of real wage growth 
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Slovakia (2004–2005) 
Pension Scheme  The reform split the mandatory PAYG scheme into a public PAYG and 
privately funded pillar. The mixed system is mandatory for new entrants to 
the labor market. Workers aged below 52 had a choice to switch from pure 
PAYG to a mixed system, and 60 % of workers had switched by 2006. 
Retirement Age  Men: 60 to 62 gradually, Women: 55 to 62 gradually 
Contribution Rate  PAYG scheme – Employer: 20.6 % to 16 % (2004), to 14 % (2005), 
Employee: 5.9 % to 4 %, one of the parents can deduct an additional 0.5 % 
in contributions for every child,  
Mixed scheme – Employer (PAYG pillar): 5 % (2005), Employer (Funded 
pillar): 9 % (2005), Employee: 4 %, one of the parents can deduct 
an additional 0.5 % in contributions for every child 
Assessed Earnings  Earnings from 5 years with the highest earnings during the 10 years prior to 
retirement   entire working period since 1994, which in turn should be at least 
10 years 
Benefit Formula  The new benefit formula made the benefit linear in the worker’s average 
earnings over his entire working history since 1994, up to a cap beyond which 
workers with more than 3 times the average earnings do not receive higher 
benefits. The formula set the benefit as the worker’s average earnings times 
the number of working years times the actual pension value. During 
a transitory period until 2006 the benefits were regressive in the worker’s 
lifetime earnings but were gradually becoming less regressive over time. 
The PAYG benefits for switchers are cut proportionally to the number of years 
they have participated in the mixed system. In addition, they will receive 
unisex annuities from savings in the pension fund. 
Indexation Rule  Indexation ad hoc   Swiss indexation  
   
Slovakia (2006) 
Pension Scheme  Multi pillar system – public PAYG pillar with privately funded pillar 
Retirement Age  No change 
Contribution Rate  Employee: the 0.5% deduction in contributions for every child was abolished 
Assessed Earnings  Entire working period since 1994, which in turn should be at least 10 years   
entire working period since 1984, which in turn should be at least 20 years 
Benefit Formula  Gradual adjustment in the benefit formula to create a stronger link between 
earnings and benefits. This was supposed to have been fully phased in by 
2006, but was prolonged until 2014, after which the benefits should indeed be 
linear in earnings. 
Indexation Rule  No change 
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